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TOOLS, INC. and I. G.
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Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 870170
Priority Schedule No. 14b

IRONWOOD EXPLORATION, INC.,
R. D. POINDEXTER, HORIZON
OIL & GAS COMPANY, WILLIAM
H. WALTON and ARDEN A. ANDERSON,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties have stipulated

to the facts and have

submitted an Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal which has
been

approved

by

the

District

Court.

Graco

accepts

the

Statement of Facts contained in Ironwood's Brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and
§78-2-2 (i) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

the

former

mechanics'

lien

statutes

(§38-1-1 et seq. U.C.A. (1953 as amended)) entitle Graco to

recover

from

the

lessee

of

an

oil well

location

charges

incurred incident to rental of equipment, sale of equipment
not

consumed

on

the

project,

transportation

charges, or

charges for repair of rented equipment,
2.
mechanics

Whether
lien

attorneyfs

the

statute,

fee provisions

§38-1-18,

required

of

the

Graco

to

differentiate between the time spent on its lien theory and
the time

spent on

its quantum

meruit

and

contractor

bond

theories, all of which are separate, cumulative theories of
recovery covering the same factual claim.
3.

Does

the

contractors

bond

statute,

§14-2-1

U.C.A., apply to rental services performed on an oil well when
the owner of the oil well fails to obtain a contractors bond
and the subcontractor suffers a loss as a result of a lack of
bond?
4.
when

it

Is the owner of an oil well unjustly enriched

retains

$10,035.32

of

monies

owed

the

general

contractor, and fails to pay a subcontractor $10,733.07 not
paid the subcontractor by the general contractor even though
the subcontractor performed its obligations under the contract?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held as a matter of law
that the mechanics lien statute, §38-1-3 U.C.A., applied to
the equipment and material rental charges supplied by Graco on
the Ironwood well.

The statute as written in 1983 allows for
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the

imposition

of

rental

charges,

equipment

sales,

transportation charges which are part of the rental agreement,
and repair and inspection costs to be lienable against the
Ironwood oil well.

Ironwood1s argument that rental charges do

not apply to oil and gas wells in an attempt to provide a
tortured reading of the mechanics lien statute based upon the
placement of semicolons within the statute itself.
court's ruling

imposing

and foreclosing

The trial

the mechanics lien

should be upheld in its entirety.
The attorney's fee provision of the mechanics lien
statute,

U.C.A.

differentiate

§38-1-18,

between

do

its separate

not

require

theories

Graco

of recovery

to
in

billing its time when each of the theories of recovery are
closely

related

factually

and

available to Graco under law.
differentiate

between

its

are

cumulative

remedies

To require Graco to attempt to

three

affirmative

theories

of

recovery would present enormous ethical and practical problems
for the attorney billing his house to different theories of
recovery on the same facts.

The trial court correctly granted

Graco judgment on the award of attorney's fees.
The contractors bond statute, U.C.A. §14-2-1, applies
to the Ironwood oil well and the services provided by Graco.
Because Ironwood failed to require Lantz to post a performance
bond Graco is entitled to judgment against Ironwood for the
full amount of the contract owed of $30,499.43 or, in the
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alternative, for the remaining $10,733.07 not covered by the
mechanics lien statute as it was for services on a separate
well location on which no lien was filed.
Ironwood has been unjustly enriched in the amount of
at least $10,035.32 because Graco provided $30,499.43 worth of
services to Lantz on Ironwood wells and Ironwood still owes
Lantz $10,035.32 on its contract with Lantz.

If Ironwood is

allowed to keep this amount Ironwood will be unjustly enriched
both in the amount it owes to Lantz and
services
Graco

Graco

provided

that have

requests

judgment

against

yet

Ironwood

in the amount of

to

be

compensated.

in the amount of

$10,035.32 as unjust enrichment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE SERVICES IT PROVIDED.

GRACO

IS

A restatement of the facts indicates that the trial
court granted judgment on Graco's mechanics lien claim in the
amount

of

$19,766.36.

This

claim

is

governed

by

the

provisions of §38-1-3 U.C.A. as it existed in 1983 and 1984.
The mechanics lien statute as it was in effect in
1983 provided:
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing
any services or
furnishing
or
renting any materials or equipment used in the
construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner; all persons who shall
do
work
or
furnish
materials
for
the
prospecting, development, preservation or
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working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil
or
gas
well,
or deposit;
and
licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished
designs,
plats,
plans,
maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or
superintendence,
or
who
have
rendered other like professional service, or
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor or furnished or rented
materials or equipment for the value of the
service rendered, labor performed or materials
or equipment furnished or rented by each
respectively, whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.
Such liens shall attach only to such interest
as the owner may have in the property, but the
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit,
whether
working
under
bond
or
otherwise, shall for the purposes of this
chapter include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises
included within the lease.
In construing the meaning of any statute, the Court
should give a plain reading to the act in question, and in the
case of ambiguity, should give primary effect to the intent of
the Legislature.

Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 692

P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).

As the Court of Appeals stated in State

v. Jones, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 60:
One of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in light of the
general purpose it was intended to serve; and
should be so interpreted and applied as to
accomplish that objective. In order to give
the statute the implementation which will
fulfill its purpose, reason and intention
sometimes prevail over technically applied
literalness. State v. Jones, 55 Utah Adv. Rep.
60, 62 (Utah App. 1987)
(quoting Andrus v.
Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 972
(1965)).
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Moreover,

because

mechanics

lien

statutes

are

remedial in nature, the Act should be liberally construed in
favor of the lien claimant.
P.2d

922, 924

statutory
will be

Calder Bros, v, Anderson, 652

(Utah 1982).

construction
analyzed

With

these general tenants of

in mind, the mechanics lien statute

in relation

to

rental charges, equipment

sales, transportation charges, and repairs as they apply.
1.

Rental Charges.

Prior to 1981 the mechanics lien statute failed to
provide a lien for rental charges.

In 1981 the Legislature,

through Ch. 170 1981 Utah Laws amended U.C.A.

§38-1-3, to

allow those renting materials or equipment the benefit of the
mechanics

lien

statutes.

The relevant part of

§38-1-3 as

amended in 1981 is one long sentence divided into sections by
semicolons.

The defendants have numbered the sections divided

in to semicolons and are claiming that the rental provisions
only apply to the first and third sections of the Act.

The

second section dealing with "a person who shall do work or
furnish materials for prospecting, development, preservation
or working on any mining claim, mine quarry or oil or gas well
or deposit; . . ."

according to Ironwood does not apply to

rental charges because the Legislature did not specifically
amend this second section to state "renting" materials.
argument

leads

to

the

absurd

conclusion

that

this

This
second

section then is a separate sentence of the Act which stands by
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itself.

A reading of the above section clearly indicates that

this "sectionf,must be read in conjunction with some other part
of the Act in order to be a sentence at all.

A proper reading

of the section is:
All persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the prospecting, development,
preservation or working of any . . . oil and
gas well . . . shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished
or rented materials, or equipment for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed or
materials or equipment furnished or rented by
each respectively . . . (emphasis added)
Thus under the plain meaning of the amended Act, and
the only rational reading of the Act as a whole, Graco is
entitled to a lien for the rental charges on the oil and gas
well subject to this action.
Assuming

arguendo there is an ambiguity as to the

effect of the amendment, the Court may examine the title to
the act for guidance as to the intent of the Legislature.
Sutherland Statutory Construction §22.29, Vol. 1A p. 263 (1985
Revision.

The title of the 1981 Amendment states:

An Act Relating to Liens; Providing Protection
for Persons Who Rent Equipment or Materials
Under the Mechanics1 Lien Statute.
The Legislature intended to amend the entire Act not just the
first and third sections as alleged by Ironwood.

As such the

rental charges were properly foreclosed under the mechanics
lien statute.
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2.

Equipment Sales,

As

the

$5,919.14

for

facts

indicate,

equipment

rental agreement.

the

furnished

invoice

as

part

also

charges

the

overall

of

Defendants cite Stanton v. Transporation

Company v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959) for the
proposition that, for material to be lienable, the material
must be consumed in its use, Stanton at 341 P.2d 211.
The quote in Stanton however dealt with the claimants
attempt

to

obtain

a

lien

for

such

items

as

"wrenches,

screwdrivers, and other tools, parts, wire brooms and supplies
sold to the (driller) by (claimant) for which the former did
not pay."

Id. Stanton 9 Utah 2d at 190.
In the case at hand there is nothing in the record as

to what

happened

to

the drill pipe or gaskets.

Ironwood

states that the bits were presumably removed upon completion
of the project.

Because, however, this factual allegation is

unsupported in the record and was not challenged at the trial
court level by affidavit, the factual determination that the
drill pipe and gaskets were part of the lien should not be
disturbed on appeal.
from using

Even if Stanton prohibits the plaintiff

the lien laws to recover the cost of equipment

sold, the Legislature amended §38-1-3 U.C.A. in 1981 to allow
a

lien

for

"equipment

furnished."

The

amendment

protects

those providing equipment under a rental agreement because the
pipe and gaskets are equipment.

Under the former law, these
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items had to fall under the definition of materials prior to
the

amended

Act.

In

1981

the

Legislature

broadened

definition of what is lienable to include equipment.

the

As such,

the 1981 amendment renders some of the language in Stanton
obsolete.
the

The equipment sales are so directly intertwined to

rental

agreement

that

they

are

lienable

under

U.C.A.

§38-1-3.
3.

Transportation Charges.

The Graco lien included $2712.14
charges.

in transportation

The charges in question were necessary to transport

the rental equipment to and from the site.

Ironwood once

again cites Stanton for the proposition that transportation
charges are not lienable.
This argument ignores the post-Stanton plain language
of the 1981 amendment that allows a lien for rental equipment
charges.

The transportation charges are part and parcel of

the rental agreement and are a major cost of doing business in
the rental market.
different

from

involved

in

The transportation charges on rentals are

that on sales because
renting

services

also

the equipment
includes

rental

equipment

servicing, repairs and transportation, all of which are rental
charges.

The Legislature broadened the definition of rental

equipment liens to expressly protect subcontractors providing
these services.

As such, §38-1-3 U.C.A., as was in effect in

1983, applied to transportation charges when they are incurred
as part

of

the

rental

services

inapplicable in this context.
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performed

and

Stanton

is

4.

Repair charges.

Ironwood disputes the $1096.00 charges for repairs to
and inspection of the rental equipment.

Again Ironwood cites

Stanton to support the proposition that such charges are not
proper subjects of the lien.
These charges are once
rental

services

which

amendment

to

the

obligated

to

keep

inspection
expenses

and

lienable

mechanics
its

repair

lienable

are

lien

rental
expenses

pursuant

again part of

to

pursuant

statute.

the overall
to

the

Since

Graco

equipment

in

are

part

of

1981

amendments

the

summary judgment affidavits to the contrary.

good
the

1981
is

repair,
necessary
absent

Graco's charges

for inspection and repair are its responsibilities under its
contract

and

are

lienable

pursuant

to

§38-1-3

U.C.A.

as

amended.
POINT II
GRACO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE IT
PREVAILED IN ITS AFFIRMATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AND GRACO NEED
NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TIME SPENT SEPARATE BUT CLOSELY
INTERRELATED THEORIES OF RECOVERY.
In the trial court action Graco prevailed in its lien
claimed

and

filed

affidavits

claiming

attorneys1

fees

$3798.75, pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-18, which provides:
In

any action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneyfs
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action. (Emphasis added)
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of

This section provides for an award of attorney's fees
whenever a party prevails on a lien foreclosure.

See Petty

Investment Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978).
Ironwood claims however that Graco must distinguish
between time spent on the lien foreclosure and time spent on
Graco1s

other

two

theories.

In support

thereof,

Ironwood

cites Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978); Utah Farm
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981);
Stubbs v. Hemert, 567 P.2d
Production

168

v. Hunter, 609 P. 2d

(Utah 1977);
1329

(Utah

Imperial-Yuma

1980);

and FMA

Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670
(Utah 1975).
None of the above cases support the proposition that
Graco must distinguish between attorney's fees spent on the
lien foreclosure and attorney's fees spent on the contractors
bond statute and quantum meruit theories.

Nelson v. Newman;

Utah Farm Credit Association v. Cox; Stubbs v. Hemert; and
Imperial-Yuma Production v. Hunter all hold that a party must
separate

time

spent

on

successfully

prosecuting

an action

where attorney's fees are available from time spent defending
a counterclaim.

See Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d at 604; Utah

Farm Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d at 66; Stubbs v.
Hemert,

567

P.2d

at

Hunter, 609 P.2d

at

171; and
1331.

Imperial-Yuma

Production

v.

Moreover, FMA Financial Corp.,

supra, held that there must be evidence of the time spent on

-11-

the case.

A flat rate without anything further does not meet

the plaintiffs burden of proof.

FMA Financial Corp. v. Build,

Inc., 17 Utah 2d at 85-86.
In the case at hand Graco pursued the same cause of
action

under

incurred

no

three

different

attorney's

fees

theories
defending

of
a

relief.

Graco

counterclaim

and

submitted a detailed affidavit regarding hours spent on the
clients case.
This
under

Court

recognizes

the Mechanics' Lien

diminish

in

any

way

a

that

Act

are

claimants

the

remedies

provided

cumulative

and

do

not

rights

enforce

the

to

obligation of contracts or any other remedy the claimant may
have.
P.2d

Harris-Dudley Plbg. v. Prof. United World Travel, 592
586/

cumulative,

588

(Utah

the

1979).

cases

Because

cited

Graco's

by

remedies

Ironwood

are

regarding

counterclaims are inapplicable to this case.
Moreover, to require Graco to differentiate between
time spent on separate but closely interrelated theories for
relief would lead to billing difficulties, and an unrealistic,
arbitrary

division

of

time.

For

example,

factual

investigation mostly likely would apply to all three theories
for relief.

If the fact investigation benefited

all three

theories, billing would be difficult.
In this situation, an attorney must either bill the
investigative time equally in thirds to each theory thereby
unnecessarily benefiting the defendant or must unrealistically
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bill all

time but essential legal

theories to the theory providing

research

on alternative

for an award of attorneys

fees, which of course would most benefit the client.

Either

scenario provides an ethically difficult decision.
The more workable alternative

is for the Court to

award reasonable attorney's fees when a party prevails under
the

lien

pleaded.

statute
The

counterclaim

regardless

fees cannot
and

what

is

of

other

be claimed
a reasonable

theories
for

the

defense

attorney's

party
of

the

fee has

always been a function of the trial court, and should remain
so

without

imposing

unrealistic

restrictions

on

attorney

billing practices.
POINT III
THE CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTE, U.C.A. §14-2-1 ET SEQ. ,
APPLIES TO IRONWOOD'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A CONTRACTORS BOND
FROM LANTZ.
As the facts indicate, defendant Ironwood failed to
require a contractors bond from Lantz. (F.5)

The contractors

bond statute in force during the time period relevant to this
case states:
The owner of any interest in land entering into
a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the
construction, addition
to, alteration, or
repair
of
any
building,
structure,
or
improvement upon land shall, before any such
work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a
bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with
good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for
the faithful performance of the contract and
prompt payment for materials ,furnished and
labor performed under the contract. This bond
runs to the owner and to all other persons as
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their interest may appear. Any person who has
furnished any materials or performed labor for
or upon any such building, structure, or
improvement, for which payment has not been
made, has a direct right of action against the
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable
value of the rented materials or eqipment
furnished, for the reasonable value of the
materials furnished, or for labor performed,
not exceeding the prices agreed upon. This
right of action accrues 40 days after the
completion, abandonment, or default in the
performance of the work provided for in the
contract.
This bond shall be exhibited
interested, upon request.
The

to any

person

issue in this case is whether the contractors

bond statute applies to the rental services provided by Graco
but not paid for by either Lantz or Ironwood.
The plain language of the Act could lend support to
either party on this issue.
careful

reading

of

Although somewhat ambiguous, a

the Act, its

legislative

purposes

and

subsequent case law, support the argument that it applies to
rental services supplied by a subcontractor on an oil well.
The Act applies to "the owner of any interest in land
entering ito a contract, involving

$2,000 or more, for the

construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any . . .
structure, or

improvement

upon

land

. . .".

Ironwood

is

clearly an owner of an interest in land involving a contract
for

improvement

interests

in

upon the

oil

wells.

land.

Ironwood

(F.l)

The

owns a leasehold

contract

improvement or structure upon the land, to-wit:
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involved
oil wells.

an

Environmental concerns

aside, there can be little question

that an oil well is a structure or an improvement upon the
land.
Moreover,

Graco

constitutes

a

party

who

has

"furnished any materials or performed labor for or upon such
building, structure or improvement for which payment has not
been made."

As Exhibit D

(Facts) indicates Graco provided

rental equipment and transportation charges in the amount of
$10,035.32.
for

recovery

either.
it

Although the statute does not expressly provide
of

rental charges, it does not exclude

them

Indeed the Utah Legislature clarified its intent when

amended

§14-2-1

materials rented."

U.C.A.

to provide

"equipment

and

1985 Utah Law C. 219 §1.

Moreover, the court often

refers to the mechanics

lien statutes in construing the meaning
bond statute.

for

of the contractors

King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13

Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).

As the court stated in King

Bros. ;
The mechanics lien statutes were designed to
prevent the land owner from taking the benefit
of improvements placed on his property without
paying for the labor and materials that went
into it. . . . Because of the common purpose
of the lien and contractors bond statutes, and
their
practically
identical
language,
adjudications as to what is lienable under the
former are helpful in determining the proper
application of the latter. j^d. 13 Utah 2d at
341.
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In this case §14-2-1 U.C.A. should be construed in
light

of

§38-1-3

U.C.A.

which

equipment and material rented
previously in this brief.
contractors

bond/

this

necessary.

Graco

is

Ironwood
because

Ironwood

the

for

a

lien

for

to an oil well as discussed

In fact/ had Ironwood obtained a
litigation

thus

would

entitled

to

not

have

judgment

been

against

for the additional $10/733.07 under U.C.A. §14-2-2
failed

U.C.A. §14-2-1.
on

provides

lien

to obtain

the bond

required

under

Alternatively, in the event Graco's judgment
claim

is

reversed

by

this

Court/

Graco

respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment against
Ironwood for the full $30/499.43 owed by Lantz.
POINT IV
IRONWOOD HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IN THE AMOUNT OF
$10/345.41.
Graco

performed

Ironwood's well. (F.3)
to Graco
(F.4)

that

$30/499.43

worth

of

work

on

This amount/ $10/733.07/ remains owed

is not covered

by the mechanics lien laws.

Ironwood has not paid Graco any amount due on Graco

invoices

but

$10/345.41

of

has
the

paid

Lantz

amount

due

or

its

under

creditors

the

contract

all

but

between

Ironwood and Lantz. (F.7)
The crux plaintiff Graco's argument is that Ironwood
has been enriched by Gracofs work in the amount of $10/733.49
and has unjustly

retained

$10/035.00 of the money

Lantz to Graco.
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owed by

If the trial court's dismissal of Graco's claim for
unjust enrichment is not reversed/ Ironwood will be unjustly
enriched

in

the

amount

of $20,768.00.

Graco

respectfully

requests judgment in the amount of $10/035.00 so that Graco
can

be

almost

fully compensated

and

Ironwood

will not be

unjustly enriched.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted

that

for

the

reasons

discussed herein the judgment of the District Court should be
affirmed regarding the judgment on Graco's lien foreclosure
and attorneys' fee award.

The judgment of the District Court

on Graco's cause of action under the contractors bond statute
and for unjust enrichment should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of August/ 1987.
McRAE & DeLAND

ROBERT M. McRAE
Attorneys for Respondent

HAMY HJSOUVALL ^
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed/ postage prepaid/
four true and correct copies of the Brief of Respondents to F.
Alan Fletcher, 1850 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake Cityf
Utah

84111 on the 27th day of August/ 1987.

£^
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Art

VIII, § 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

either en banc or in divisions. The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the supreme court. If a justice
of the supreme court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a
cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the
cause.
Repeals a n d Reenactments. — See the
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the
beginning of this article. See former Article

Vin, § 2 in the bound volume for the former
provisions comparable to this section.

Sec* 3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court.]
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
States. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs
and orders necessary for the exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the
beginning of this article. See former Art. VIII,

§ 4 in the bound volume for the former provisions comparable to this section.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas corpus proceeding, which was properly before the
supreme court on appeal, held that defendant
had been deprived of his constitutional right to
an appeal, and the alleged error could not have
been corrected on appeal and the defendant
had taken the initiative to seek an appeal before the time for appeal had passed, supreme
court exercised its discretion to issue the common law writ of certiorari to allow defendant a
direct review in the supreme court of the alleged errors in his trial. Boggess v. Morris
(Utah 1981) 635 P.2d 39.

ANALYSIS

Appellate jurisdiction.
Certified questions.
Certiorari.
Habeas corpus.
Appellate jurisdiction.
Appellate jurisdiction connotes review of the
action of an inferior court federal courts are
not inferior courts to the Utah supreme court
and supreme court's answer to certified questions in a case that originated in or is to be
adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction within the meaning of
this section. Holden v. N L Industries, Inc.
(Utah 1981) 629 P.2d 428.

H a b e a s corpus*
Matters which have been or could have been
raised on appeal cannot be brought before the
court by habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a
civil matter and the findings of the trial court
are presumed to be proper unless there is no
substantial evidence to sustain them. Schad v.
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263; Wilson v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 368,496 P.2d 711;
Leggroan v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 403, 497 P
2d 17; Zumbrunnen v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d
428, 497 P.2d 34.
Law Reviews
Judicial Socialization: An
Empirical Study, 11J. Contemp. L. 423 (1985).

Certified questions.
Supreme court of Utah does not have jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified to it by the federal courts in cases that are
to be adjudicated or originate in the federal
courts; therefore, supreme court's certification
rule was withdrawn. Holden v. N L Industries,
Inc. (Utah 1981) 629 P 2d 428.
Certiorari.
Where, due to untimeliness, a criminal conviction was no longer subject to review by the
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78-2-1.5

JUDICIAL CODE

Membership on state law library board,
§ 37-1-1.
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy,
§ 78-7-21.

Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art.
Vin, Sec. 7.
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15;
§ 49-7a-l et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30.
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§§ 67, 68.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 465; 48A C.J.S.
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

Key Numbers. — Courts *=» 101, 248;
Judges «=» 1, 7 to 12.

78-2-1.5. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court

justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

78-2-1.6. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch.
134, § 1; 1981, ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch.
267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
6

SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1,
1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
7

PRIVATE CONTRACTS

14-2-1

History: L. 1983. ch. 61, § 3.

14-1-16. Attorney's fees,
The prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 4.

14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Procurement
Code.
This chapter shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, 5 5.

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
14-2-2. Failure to require bond — Direct liability - Limitation of action*

Section
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics
an£
i materialmen — Attorney's
, . rt . „
^'
», _.
14 2 4
" " - Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficeies, trustees.

14-2-L Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished,
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, § H to 3; C.L.
1917, 5§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-

ment inserted "equipment and materials
rented," after "material furnished" near the
end of the first sentence of the first paragraph
of the section; divided the second sentence into
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CONTRACTOR BONDS

expressly required the contractor to pay for all
labor and materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distinguished, 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955).
Where owners of tract of land upon which a
franchised restaurant was built accepted performance bond from the contractor, the obligation of which ran only to them and not to "all
other persons as their interest may appear,"
they were liable for payment of judgment for
materials delivered, even though the contractor had been hired by the restaurant chain and
owners had no privity of contract with him,
since they had dealt directly with the contractor and had supervised payment of subcontractore. Bennett v. Downard, 533 P.2d 1348 (Utah
1975).

Terms of bond.
Where the condition of the bond is that the
surety will indemnify the owner if the contractor fails to pay for material and labor, it is not
mc
^ a bond contemplated by this section so as
to
allow a direct action by the materialman
against the surety, as it does not promise that
&« contractor will pay for the material and
l abor - Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix
J n J m - C<>" 3 U t a h 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448
viyoo).
Unlicensed subcontractor.
The fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed
will not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly against the owner who fails to require a
bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299
P.2d 837 (1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors*
Bonds § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
A.L.R. — Effect on compensation of archi-

tect or building contractor of express provision
in private building contract limiting the cost of
the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=» 313.

14-2-2. Failure to require bond
tation of actions.

Direct liability — Limi-

Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain
such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall
be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished
or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced within one year
from the last date the last materials were furnished or the labor performed.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §5 4, 5; C.L. 1917,
§§ 3762, 3763; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,17-2-2; L.
1965, ch. 24, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Application of statute of limitations.
Construction of terms of bond.
Duty to exact bond.
Failure of builder to require bond.
Installment payments by debtor-contractor.
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of general contractor.
Prejudgment interest.
Substantial performance.
Sufficiency of bond.
Supplier as materialman.
Unlicensed subcontractor.
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38-1-3

Collateral References.
Mechanics' Liens^^SG.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 90, 97.
53 Am. Jur. 2d 512, Mechanics' Liens
§i.

applicable. Roberts v. Hansen, 25 U. (2d)
190, 479 P. 2d 345.
Time for filing lien.
Materialman who supplies homeowner
is original contractor within meaning of
statute and has eighty rather than sixty
days within which to . file mechanic's lien
against homeowner's transferee. Smith
Brothers Lbr. Co. v. Johnson, 19 U. (2d)
107, 42G P. 2d 811.

Who is a "contractor" within provisions
of lien law which limit liens for material
or labor furnished to contractor to amount
earned but unpaid on contract, or give
such liens by subrogation, 83 A L. R. 1152.

38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores
mined.—Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing any materials used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects
and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or
who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor,
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of
the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the premises
included within the lease.
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907,
§§ 1372, 1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, en. 27,
§ 1 2 ; 0. L. 1917, §§286, 3722, 3731, 3732,
3747; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973,
ch. 73, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1973 amendment substituted "any
services or * * # in any manner" near the
beginning of the first sentence for "labor
upon, or furnishing materials to be used
in, the construction or alteration of, or
addition to, or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land; aU
foundry men and boilermakers; all persons
performing labor or furnishing materials
for the construction, repairing or carrying
on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting
works."
Cross-Re ference.
Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen under private contracts, 14-2-1.
Construction and application.
The purpose of the lien statutes is to

protect those who have added directly to
the value of property by performing labor
or furnishing materials upon it. Stanton
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184,
341 P. 2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d)
395, 4C4 P. 2d 387.
This statute contemplates that the material to be lienable must be consumed in its
use on the property. Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 341 P.
2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 395, 464
P. 2d 387.
Where several lien claimants are unable
to segregate and fix the value of materials
which went into various properties, it is
proper to apply an equitable apportionment rule which would charge each lot
with an equal share of the totals claimed
by the several materialmen; and in applying this rule it should be made to appear
that there is no available means of definite
proof as to just what material went into
which unit of property, that there is sufficient proof that some material actually
went into structures, and that the land is
sufficiently identified and described in the

473

38-1-17

LIENS

38-1-17. Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys' fee to subcontractor.—As between the owner and the contractor the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien and such
reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording
said notice of claim of lien.
H i s t o r y : E . S. 1893 & C. L. 1907, §1394;
O. L. 1917, §3744; B . S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-17; L. 1961, ch. 76, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment added provision for
reasonable attorney's fees for preparation
and recording of notice of claim of lien.
I n t e r e s t on judgment.
I n action to foreclose mechanic's lien

and to recover for services rendered under contract of employment, it is not error
to allow interest on sum awarded. Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co.,
24 U. 1, 66 P . 360.
Collateral References.
Mechanics' Liens<§=>310(l).
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 350.
53 Am. J u r . 2d 942, Mechanics' Liens
§432.

38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.—In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
H i s t o r y : B . S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch.
58, § 1 ; 0. L. 1907, §1400; O. L. 1917,
§3750; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L.
1961, ch. 76, § 2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment deleted a provision
fixing the minimum amount of attorneys'
fees of not to exceed $25.
Cross-Be ference.
Attorneys' fee in suit for wages, 3427-1.
Denial on excessive claim.
Where it appears on trial that contractor has substantially performed his cont r a c t b u t t h a t he attempts to overcharge
the owner in setting the total amount due
on a cost-plus-ten-per-cent contract, the
court docs not abuse its discretion in refusing to award the contractor attorney
fees in suit to collect upon such contract.
Shupe v. Mcnlove, 18 U. (2d) 130, 417 P. 2d
246.
Bednction b y trial court.
Lower court can properly reduce award
of attorney's fees to party successful in
foreclosing mechanic's lien by one-half of
j u r y ' s award since under statute award of
j u r y is advisory only. Frehner v. Morton,
18 XT. (2d) 422, 424 P . 2d 446.
Successful p a r t y .
Award of attorney's fees is available to

person defending against lien since this
section confers that benefit not only on
one who asserts lien but upon "the successful p a r t y . " Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22
U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325.
Validity of lien.
Where claims of materialman for mechanics' liens are valid, he is entitled to
a reasonable attorney's fee under this section where penalty provided by 38-1-24 for
alleged failure of materialman to release
liens is sought by builder who contends
that the lienB are invalid. Brimwood
Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply
Co., 14 U. (2d) 419, 385 P. 2d 982.
Materialman is not entitled to attorney's
fee in proceedings to foreclose mechanic's
lien where the original notice of lien was
deficient and attempted amendment to correct deficiencies was not filed until after
the time for filing had expired. Roberts
Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Co., 22 U. (2d) 105, 449 P.
2d 116.
Collateral Beferences.
Mechanics' Liens<$=>310(l).
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 353.
53 Am. J u r . 2d 943, Mechanics' Liens
§433.
Amount of compensation of attorney for
services as to mechanic's lien in absence
of contract or statute fixing amount, 56
A. L. R. 2d 114.
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MECHANICS AND OTHER LIENS

Ch. 170

When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated
above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then such subcontractor's or person's hen rights, as set forth herein, are extended so as to
make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and claim a
hen 80 days after completion of the onginal contract of the original contractor
Approved March 24, 1981

CHAPTER 170
H B No 191

(Passed March 5 1981

In effect May 12, 1981 )

MECHANIC'S LIENS - ITEMS COVERED
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS, PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR PERSONS WHO RENT
EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS UNDER THE MECHANICS1 LIEN STATUTE.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 73, LAWS OF UTAH 1973

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
73, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read
38-1-3.

Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores mined.

Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner, all persons who shall do work or furnish materials
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit, and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who
have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a
hen upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented materials^-,] or equipment for the
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or equipment
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner
or of any other person ^acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise Such hens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in
the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit,
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the
premises included within the lease
Approved March 27, 1981

